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Abstract. This position paper connects the areas and communities of abstract
argumentation and attack-defence trees in the area of security. Both areas deal
with attacks, defence and support and both areas rely on applications dealing
with human aggressive activities. The unifying idea we use in this paper is to
regard arguments as AND-OR attack trees as proposed by Schneier in the se-
curity domain. The core model, which is acceptable for both communities, is a
pair pS,q, where S is a set of attack trees (the “arguments”) and is a binary
relation on attack trees (the “attack” relation). This leads us to the notion of an
attack-defence framework, which provides an argumentation-based semantics
for attack-defence trees and more general attack-defence graphs.
1 Introduction
Argumentation is an interdisciplinary research area concerning the study of conflicts
that arise due to competing objectives and views across a range of disciplines. Security
is an obvious example of such a discipline where there are human actors with com-
peting interests. The interests and objectives of an attacker seeking to obtain secrets,
disrupt services, track users, etc., conflict with those of a defender such as system ad-
ministrators, software engineers, security guards and others professionals that protect
our society both online and offline.
It should be of no surprise that there are immediate parallels between argumen-
tation and methods developed for modelling the relationships between the actions
of attackers and defenders in security, notably attack-defence trees [1] and defence
trees [2]. In this work we show that it is possible to provide directly a semantics for
attack-defence trees by building on models of abstract argumentation. However, on
the surface, there are a few differences in modelling styles in argumentation compared
to attack-defence trees. Notably, in argumentation, various types of relations can be
reduced to a single attack-relation tree formed of attack relations, whereas established
semantics for attack-defence trees based on multisets collapse such trees of layers of
attacks, defences, counter-attacks, etc., to a two-layer structure where there is only one
layer of attacks, some of which are countered by a layer of defences. We develop bipo-
lar argumentation frameworks [3] that incorporate a notion of support [4] and hence
are capable of modelling in styles favoured by both the argumentation and security
communities. This enables us to translate added value in both directions.
From security to argumentation. Traditionally, arguments are modelled in a
fairly binary fashion: if an argument is attacked by another argument that is not at-
tacked then it is out, hence cannot be an acceptable argument. The source of potential
confusions arises in argumentation when there are loops, for example loops may be
created in legal arguments where witnesses attack each other. In security, the sources
of uncertainty are quite different. They come from the fact that many attacks take
resources such as security guards, networking equipment, or botnets, which have as-
sociate costs, capacities and likelihoods of success. There may be other factors such as
the risk of exposing the identity of the attackers leaving them open to prosecution (the
feeling of impunity), balanced against the motives of a profile of attacker. For such
reasons, semantics proposed for attack-defence trees typically take into account quan-
tities and qualities in various attribute domains that indicate the capability of attacker
and defenders to fulfil their actions. This quantitative aspect we translate from the
attack-defence trees to argumentation frameworks by making explicit a notion of ab-
stract “weapons” that represent the actions and resources that an attacker or defender
can use to perpetrate attacks or hold out against them.
From argumentation to security. As mentioned above, much of the attention in
the argumentation community revolves around resolving disputes when there are cy-
cles in arguments. Thus the graph structures considered in argumentation are more
flexible than the trees stratified into layers of attacks and defences, that form attack-
defence trees. While it may be useful for security to incorporate loops, in this work,
we take a clearer and simpler first step in that direction. We allow not only trees, but
also directed acyclic graphs to appear. Such an extension of attack-defence trees is
useful for making explicitly when multiple instances of nodes representing actions of
an attacker are in fact the same attack, hence we need not kill all instances to counter
that attack, but only the one instance of that action, which of course impacts the re-
source sensitive analysis [5]. A more adventurous aspect of the modest liberalisation
of attack-defence trees that we propose is to forget about the distinction between at-
tacks and defences. We simply have arguments that attack each other, and need not
explicitly indicate that the argument is an attack tree associated with an attacker or de-
fender. This allows the modelling of scenarios where two actions of an attacker may
be in conflict, for example, enabling a DDoS attack may blow the cover for a stealthy
attacker gathering private information from inside the system. Furthermore, a defen-
sive action, such as installing a hypervisor, for separating processes sharing the same
underlying hardware may mitigate attacks exploiting vulnerabilities in inter-process
communication in software, but may support cache timing side channels at the hard-
ware level. Going further, some nodes may not even be attackers or defenders, they
may be engineering requirements such as protocol standards or legal requirements
such as clauses of the GDPR regulation that are impacted by a successful attack or by
adopting a particular defensive strategy.
Table 1 provides an overview comparing the security and argumentation domains
from which this paper draws. Considering the above observations, since these domains
were already close we believe that a relatively small step is required to build a general
framework accommodating the needs of both communities — in one way we move
from trees to more general graphs and in the other direction we bring in resource
considerations. For example, it is reasonable that the legal domain may have some
resource consideration, e.g., whether an argument stands may take into account the
number of witnesses and their credibility. In the security domain, it is reasonable to
lift some constraints on patterns of attacks and defences.
Table 1: Comparison between argumentation and security domains
Argumentation frameworks Attack-defence trees
Argumentation is a well-developed area with a
community formed over 50 years.
Strong security community using methods in-
spired by fault trees which have been in use for
over 50 years.
Have a range of semantics. May benefit from improved semantics.
Mainly concerned with loops. May benefit from handling loops, or at least
more general acyclic graphs.
Semantics focus on evidence for claims, i.e.,
proof certificates.
Could benefit from more proof theory.
Trees are a well-behaved case for this area. Mainly concerned with trees with a stratified
structure, formed by alternating layers of at-
tacks and defences.
Emphasises attack relations, allowing arbitrary
alternations between moves of attackers and de-
fenders in their underlying games.
Reduces counter-attacks to a single layer of at-
tacks countered by defences, by using support
relations.
We develop these ideas as follows. In Section 2, we provide background on the
traditional notion of an argumentation framework and make explicit obvious parallels
and differences compared to attack-defence trees. In Section 3, we close the gap be-
tween the models by introducing the notion of attack-defence framework, firstly by
defining what it means for one attack tree to attack another attack tree, and, secondly,
by providing an algorithm accommodating the notion of support. In Section 4, we dis-
cuss the argumentation-based model introduced in juxtaposition with key examples of
attack-defence trees, and highlight extension and directions enabled.
2 Preliminaries drawing from Argumentation
We briefly summarise mathematical tools of argumentation on which we build. An
argumentation framework is a pair consisting of a set of arguments S and a relation
 Ď S ˆ S called the attack relation. Argumentation traditionally defines set theoret-
ically or algorithmically two subsets for an argumentation framework pS ,q.
– The in set E` Ď S , which is a maximal (with respect to subset inclusion) conflict-
free set such that: if z is such that @y.py  z ñ Dy1 P E s.t. y1  yq then z P E.
I.e., any argument attacking an element of E is attacked by another element of E.
By conflict-free, we mean that no two x, y P E are such that x y.
– The out set E´ “ ty | Dx P E` s.t. x yu.
If we restrict to acyclic graphs these sets partition the set of arguments, i.e., we have
E` X E´ “ H and E` Y E´ “ S .
In the acyclic setting, the above sets can be generated algorithmically from pS ,q













i are defined induc-
tively as follows. We say x is not attacked in S i if  Dy P S i s.t. y x.
1. Base case: Let S 0 “ S , E`0 “ H and E
´
0 “ H.
2. Inductive case: Let S n`1 “ S nzpE`n Y E´n q.
Let E`n`1 “ tx P S n`1 | x is not attacked in S n`1u.
Let E´n`1 “
!










Fig. 1: An argumentation framework which
is also an attack-defence tree.
Consider the example argumentation
framework in Figure 1. The argumen-
tation framework depicted is also an
attack-defence tree [1], where, in attack-
defence tree terminology, the attack re-
lations are countermeasures, where an
action of an attacker is defeated by an
action of a defender, or an action of de-
fender is defeated by a counter-attack
of an attacker. In the figure, attack rela-
tions are represented by dotted double-
headed arrows in order to align with the
dotted line notation of attack-defence
trees. This notation, at the same time,
makes explicit the direction of the at-
tack, as attack relation indicates. The
colours are not necessary for argumenta-
tion frameworks; they simply allow ease
of reading when there is a clear alterna-
tion between two actors the proponent
and opponent, i.e., the actions of the at-
tacker and defender.
For the example in Figure 1, the in set and out set are as follows.
E` “ tVideo Camera,Defeat Lock,Reinforce, Security Guard,Physical Securityu
E´ “ tDefeat Guard,Break in,Locku
Thus we say Physical Security is an acceptable argument with respect to E`, since
any argument that attacks it (i.e., Break In) is defeated by some element of E`, (e.g.,
Security Guard). We note that E` is a maximal admissible set, which, in argumenta-
tion terminology is called the preferred extension. Thus the algorithm used to generate
E` emphasises that the preferred extension is easy to compute in the acyclic setting.
In addition to the notion of attack, we require also a notion of support in order
to provide an argumentation-based semantics for attack-defence trees. In order to ac-
commodate support — e.g., the act of supporting a security goal of a system with a
range of network and physical security measures, as is possible using attack-defence
trees — we take a step towards a more general model. We would like to define acyclic
bipolar argumentation frameworks, that is a pair of relations on a set of arguments S :
pS ,,Ñq ,where Ď S ˆ S ,Ñ Ď S ˆ S and Y Ñ is acyclic
The first relation x  y indicates that x attacks y. The second relation x Ñ y repre-
sents that x supports y. These bipolar argumentation frameworks accommodate con-









Fig. 2: Modelling counter-defence “Strong Password” as an attack or as a support.
Argumentation convention: Most argumentation approaches reduce support to at-
tacks (i.e., eliminate support). This is achieved by reducing y Ñ b to y  β  b by
making use of auxiliary node β. Thus y supports b by defending against an attacker.
See for example, the bipolar argumentation framework (which happens to be also an
attack-defence tree) to the left of Figure 2. In that example, the Strong Password y,
attacks the Dictionary Attack β, in order to support the Password b.
Security convention: One might argue that the above approach drawing directly
from argumentation is not quite the right viewpoint, since the Strong Password does
not actively attack the Dictionary Attack. What really happens is that the Strong Pass-
word strengthens the password to make it more resistant to the Dictionary Attack.
This idea is reflected in the existing multiset semantics for attack-defence trees [1]
that eliminates counter-attacks by reducing them to supports. Under such semantics
for attack-defence trees, an argumentation framework with relations as depicted to
the left of Figure 2 might more accurately be modelled, as depicted in the example
on the right of Figure 2. In that diagram, instead of employing Strong Password as a
counter-attack for Dictionary Attack we employ it as a support for access control.
The use of the support relation from the bipolar argumentation frameworks allows
the fact that the Strong Password really is supporting the Access Control mechanism
rather than attacking the Dictionary Attack to be made explicit. It is a modelling choice
which presentation better respects the situation, a semantics based on argumentation
that accommodates support (to be developed in the next section) would likely distin-
guish these scenarios, i.e., the diagrams in Figure 2 may be distinguished by their “in
sets” (which should be a suitable generalisation of preferred extensions). To get a feel-
ing of the intuition behind why this should be the case, observe that in the diagram
on the right of Figure 2 nobody attacks the Dictionary Attack so it should be declared
“in” by default, that is β P E`; whereas in the diagram on the left the Dictionary At-
tack is out by default, since it is attacked by a Strong Password that is not attacked by
anyone, hence is in by default. Thus in an extended algorithm accommodating support
we expect y P E` and β P E´ for the attack-defence tree on the right of Figure 2.
In contrast, instead of “Strong Password”, consider employing an anti-bruteforcing
defensive mechanism, such as a CAPTCHA, against a Dictionary Attack. This could
be considered to be more accurately modelled as an attack on the Dictionary Attack
denoted by β rather than in terms of supporting the Access Control goal. This is a
modelling choice for the security expert.
Access Control
b Password y Strong Password β Dictionary Attack
Fig. 3: The dictionary attack here attacks both the password and strong password.
Going further, the diagram in Figure 3 is an attack-defence tree. This is different
from the support relation to the right of Figure 2, since by attacking directly the access
control argument we suggest that both the Password and Strong Password are killed by
the dictionary attack. In order to interpret such scenarios, we require richer structure
than provided by traditional argumentation frameworks à la Dung [6]. In order to
formally present such a semantics, further machinery is defined in the next section.
3 Attack-defence frameworks: trees attacking trees
The semantics in this section are built out of those in Section 2 and finite sets of mul-
tisets of weapons, where weapons are “actions” in attack-defence tree terminology.
g Security Guard m
Overpower
o Outnumber k Knives
Fig. 4: A joint attack relation as an
attack-defence tree.
We start with defining enhanced argumentation
frameworks with joint attacks pS ,Rq, where S is
viewed as a set of weapons (the atomic actions
that appear at the leaves of attack trees), and R is
more general than just a binary relation over S :
we allow the source of the attack to be a multiset
of elements of S . Thus R is a relation between
finite multisets built from S , say MultisetpS q, and
elements of S , i.e., R Ď MultisetpS qˆS . We use
the notation a˚b˚c to represent the multiset with
three elements, the weapons a, b and c.
Allowing multisets of weapons to attack
weapons, allows us to model scenarios such as
o ˚ k R g, as depicted in Figure 4, using an aux-
iliary node, labeled Overpower. Note that while
such scenarios are not expressible using traditional argumentation frames, they do ap-
pear in several richer models of argumentation, where such attack relation are called
joint attacks [7, 8]. In the attack-defence tree notion in Figure 4, the fact that multiple
actions/weapon/resources must be used together is depicted using an arc between the
arrows, which is a conjunctive refinement in attack tree terminology [9].
We will use argumentation frameworks with joint attacks to define a semantics
for another argumentation framework with more structure, which we call an attack-
defence framework, since it will generalise attack-defence trees to more general graph-
ical structures, in the spirit of argumentation frameworks.
We denote attack-defence frameworks as a quintuple:
pS,,Ñ, S ,Bq where Ď Sˆ S,Ñ Ď Sˆ S, andB Ď Sˆ SetpMultisetpS qq.
Its arguments m P S, denoted in bold, are mapped by functional relation B to sets of
multisets of weapons drawn from the set S (the set of weapons of the argumentation
frame with joint attack above). Think of the resources assigned to arguments as basic
AND-OR attack trees in the original sense of Schneier [9]. I.e., each node is part of
an attack-defence tree consisting of only the actions of the attacker or those of the
defender (the connected green or red components only in the example figures). Attack
trees allow for actions to be:
– conjunctively refined, requiring several actions to be performed to realise the ac-
tion refined, as denoted using multisets of actions,
– or disjunctively refined, where one of the possible actions in the disjunction suf-
fices to realise the action refined, as denoted using the sets of multisets.
Thus we take the viewpoint that elements of our attack-defence frameworks rep-
resent attack trees, more precisely sets of multisets of weapons regarded as AND-OR
attack trees flattened after applying the standard mapping to multisets [10] that reduces
the attack tree to a disjunctive normal form. From an argumentation perspective we
are essentially assuming that arguments are attack trees. These attack trees represent
agents carrying each a variety of weapons, where each of these weapons are elements
of S and the sets of multisets represent a choice between a number of combination
of weapons that may be employed. Note this viewpoint does not distinguish between
agents that are attackers or defenders, agents playing any role maybe be equipped with
weapons in this manner.
3.1 Interpreting the attack relation of attack-defence frameworks
We first explain how to interpret the attack relation only, for attack-defence frame-
works. Consider the following example of an attack tree denoted as a set of multisets:
m B tpa1 ˚ a2q , b1, b2u, where a1, a2, b1, b2 P S . The above example may be regarded
as the attack tree in Figure 5, where a node denoted with an arc represents conjunctive
refinement, and a node without an arc represents disjunctive refinement.
Mercenary 1 (m)
Composite Weapon 1 (a1 ˚ a2)
a1 a2
b1 b2
Fig. 5: An attack tree denoted by
tpa1 ˚ a2q , b1, b2u. The resources ac-
cumulated at each node are indicated in
brackets.
We now explain the meaning of m.
We are relying in underlying argumen-
tation frameworks with joint attacks of
the form pS ,Rq in order to provide a se-
mantics for the attack relation.
*1) The meaning of m is a collection
of three weapons. The first weapon
is a composite weapon built up of
two component weapons a1 and a2
denoted by a1 ˚ a2. Note that ˚ is
used to denote a multiset consisting
of two elements a1 and a2. The sec-
ond weapon is b1 and the third is b2.
*2) So, if we want to attack m we
need to attack all three compo-
nents’ weapons and leave m without
weapons. This complements that perspective that, if m were to be used to attack
another attack tree, there are three options for executing the attack and hence, if
it is not the case that all three attack options are defeated, then the attack may be
perpetrated.
Expressions like tpa1 ˚a2q, b1, b2u are understood as resource weapons, which can
be used for attack or for defence. pa1 ˚ a2q is a composite weapon which has two
components. So to neutralise the composite weapon pa1 ˚ a2q we need to kill at least
one of its components, and to attack m we must attack each of its weapons.
So, if n B tpα1 ˚ α2 ˚ α3q, δ1, δ2u is the set of weapons of another argument, say
Mercenary 2, keen to attack m, say Mercenary 1, then for n to attack m it must attack









Fig. 6: An attack tree attacking another attack tree.
*3) So, we have:
n m iff n pa1 ˚ a2q
and n b1
and n b2
So for n to attack any single weapon x (such as one of the weapons in m), we
need a weapon in n to attack x. So we follow rule *4):
*4) We interpret disjunctive attacks [11] and attacks on multisets as follows.
tz, yu x iff def. zRx_ yRx
u z ˚ y iff def. uRz_ uRy
where z ˚ y is a weapon with two components. So, for example
u tpz ˚ yq,wu iff pu pz ˚ yq and uRwq iff ppuRz_ uRyq ^ uRwq.
Therefore we have
*5) tpα1 ˚ α2 ˚ α3q, δ1, δ2u x iff rδ1Rx or δ2Rx or pα1 ˚ α2 ˚ α3qRxs, and















Fig. 7: Two possible joint attack relations realising the attack in Fig. 6.
This gives a full meaning to n  m in terms of the underlying argumentation
frame with joint attacks that can realise the attack relations indicated, where the attack
relation is restricted to a multiset of weapons attacking individual weapons.
Thus for the above example in Figure 6, one such underlying argumentation frame-
work generated from n m is the following relation R1.
δ1 R1 a2 δ1 R1 b1 δ1 R1 b2
Another example that would also realise the attack n  m would be relation R2
defined as follows.
α1 ˚ α2 ˚ α3 R2 b1 α1 ˚ α2 ˚ α3 R2 a1 δ2 R2 b2
These two possible joint attack relations realising the attack in Figure 6 are de-
picted by the respective diagrams in Figure 7, as indicated by the overlaid attack re-
lations from multisets of weapons in attack tree n to weapons in m. Obviously, this
is not an exhaustive list of joint attack relations; indeed there are 54 such joint attack
relations realising the attack between the trees in this example. It is sufficient for one
of those joint attack relations to be realisable in practice, in order for the attack n m
to be realisable in practice.
Following the method illustrated above, it is clear that we can give a semantics
for the attack relation on attack-defence frameworks, where trees may attack trees in
terms of a set of argumentation frameworks with joint attacks.
For a further example consider Figure 8. Here we have, according to our weapon
interpretation the following.
b B tb1, b2u β B tα1, α2u x B tx1, x2u.
We get tb1, b2u tα1, α2u tx1, x2u.
α1, α2 are used as weapons to kill tx1, x2u. So the meaning of tα1, α2u tx1, x2u
is pα1Rx1 ^ α1Rx2q _ pα1Rx1 ^ α2Rx2q _ pα2Rx1 ^ α2Rx2q _ pα2Rx1 ^ α1Rx2q.
The meaning of tb1, b2u tα1, α2u is similar, namely pb1Rα1^b1Rα2q_pb1Rα1^
b2Rα2q _ pb2Rα1 ^ b2Rα2q _ pb2Rα1 ^ b1Rα2q.
password
x1 No Common Words x2 Long password Brute Force
α1 DarkNet List α2 Language Attack Anti-BruteForce
b1 CAPTCHA b2 Lock Account
Fig. 8: A variation on Figure 3, where each node has a choice of weapon to employ.
Putting the above together, an argumentation framework that realises the above
constraints is depicted in Figure 9. That is, we have an attack relation R such that:
b1 R α1 b1 R α2 α1 R x1 α2 R x2





Fig. 9: An example of an argumentation
framework realising the attack relations in
Figure 8. Notice that the argumentation
framework generated need not be a tree.
For the argumentation framework
defined by R it is clear that we can ask
traditional argumentation questions such
as: what is the preferred extension, i.e.,
the in set E`, for the realisation of the
attack-defence framework in Figure 8,
as given in Figure 9. The preferred ex-
tension is of course the following set.
E` “ tb1, x1, x2u
Notice that, since x B tx1, x2u, for x to
be acceptable it is sufficient that x1 or x2
is an acceptable argument. Thus since x1
and x2 both happen to be acceptable with
respect to E`, we can claim that x is ac-
ceptable with respect to E`. Similarly,
since b B tb1, b2u and b1 is acceptable
with respect to E` we have b is acceptable with respect to E` (recall sets repre-
sent a disjunctive refinement in attack trees, i.e., a choice of possible attacks, so it is
sufficient for one multiset in the set of multisets to be acceptable). In contrast, since
β B tα1, α2u and neither α1 nor α2 is acceptable with respect to E` (equivalently they
are both in E´), β is not an acceptable argument with respect to E`.
In summary, in this example b and x are “in” and β is “out”. This is exactly as
expected for the traditional argumentation frame, in the sense described in Section 2,
where we take b, β and x to be atomic arguments and define the attack relation as
b  β  x. The reason, or evidence for the admissibility of x is however now
more fine grained, reflecting the more fine grained nature of the arguments. Since
for each underlying argumentation framework E` is unique in this acyclic setting,
it is sufficient to say “x is an acceptable argument with respect to the argumentation
framework defined by R”, where one such R is depicted in Figure 9.
3.2 Interpreting the support relation
But what about support? Here we explain support and provide a semantics in terms
of an algorithm rewriting the attack-defence frameworks introduced in this work, in-
spired by the traditional algorithm for argumentation frameworks at the top of Sec-
tion 2. We make use of the attack tree in Figure 10 to guide the development of an
algorithm suitable for both the security and argumentation communities. The example
features Cloudbursting, which is the practice of scaling a service temporarily to the
Cloud, so as to cope with spikes of demand and to sit out distributed denial of service
attacks (DDoS) [12].
In our algorithm, we make use of the concept of a belt. A belt (a maximal anti-
chain) for a bipolar argumentation frame is a set B Ď S such that:
– For no x, y P B does x y or x Ñ y hold. Hence B is conflict free.
– every z P S is either below or above or in B.
To understand the terminology “maximal anti-chain” used above observe the fol-
lowing. A maximal chain in pS ,q is a maximal sequence x1, x2, . . . xn such that for
all i “ 1, . . . n ´ 1, xi  xi`1. Thus every maximal chain containing an argument z
intersects a belt B in exactly one point.
The idea is that we start with the belt consisting of all arguments that are not
attacked or supported, i.e., the sources of the graph. We then move forwards across
the attack-defence framework to another belt reachable by realising the attack and
support relation of a node in that belt.
Service Availability
In-house Servers
s1 Server 1 s2 Server 2 d DDoS
c Cloudburst
Fig. 10: A bipolar argumentation framework involving support.
We firstly illustrate what our algorithm should do on the attack-defence framework
in Figure 10. To be precise, we specify this attack-defence framework as the following
quadruple defined in the bullet points below.
– The abstract arguments, i.e., the nodes of the graph:
tService Availability, In-house Servers,Server 1,Server 2,Cloudburst,DDoSu
– The attack relation:
DDoS In-house Servers
– The support relation:
In-house Servers Ñ Service Availability Cloudburst Ñ Service Availability
Server 1 Ñ In-house Servers Server 2 Ñ In-house Servers
– The (initial) resource assignment:
Service Availability BH
In-house Servers BH
Server 1 B ts1u
Server 2 B ts2u
Cloudburst B tcu
DDoS B tdu
Remark 1. Observe that Service Availability and In-house Servers are initially as-
signed no resources, as indicated by the empty set. This is because these arguments
have no resources inherently, by themselves, instead they inherit their resources via
support relations from the arguments Server 1, Server 2, and Cloudburst. Thus if we
consider the argumentation frame without the DDoS node, we could represent this sce-
nario using the attack tree consisting of the single node Service Availability, assigned
the resources ts1, s2, cu. The advantage of using explicit support relations rather than
a single node is that we can employ more fine-grained precision indicating that the
in-house servers are affected by the DDoS attack, but Cloudbursting is not affected by
a DDoS attack.
Observe also that the sub-framework consisting of “In-house Servers”, “Server 1”
and “Server 2” could alternatively be modelled by a single node “In-house Servers”
with resource assignment ts1, s2u. That modelling decision would not changing the
meaning of the tree, since the DDoS attack takes out both servers indiscriminately.
We propose an algorithm that executes as follows on Figure 10.
Initialisation: The initial belt (those nodes that are not attacked or supported by
any other node) is defined as follows:
tCloudburst,DDoS,Server 1,Server 2u
Note all of these arguments should correspond to leaves of some attack-defence tree
and hence should have resources assigned to them, which is indeed the case for this
example.
Step 1: We consider some belt reachable from the initial belt by taking at most
one step away from the initial belt, with respect to the attacks and supports. For this
example, there is only one choice: the following belt, which is reachable by the attack
and support relations in one step:
tCloudburst, In-house Serversu
Notice that argument Cloudburst does not advance, if it were to advance we would
not have a belt. Firstly, we update the attack-defence framework to reflect the sup-
port relations resulting in the attack defence framework where the resources assigned
to “Server 1” and “Server 2” are sent to “In-house Servers” — resulting in the new
annotation ts1, s2u for that node.
Secondly, we apply the construction from the previous section to generate an argu-
mentation framework (with joint attacks) based on the weapons given by the resource
assignment. I.e., we interpret d  ts1, s2u, thereby generating the relation R1 consist-
ing of d R1 s1 and d R1 s2.
Step 2: As with Step 1 above, we progress to the next belt:
tService Availabilityu
This belt is reachable by two supports from the nodes of the previous belt Cloudburst
and In-house Servers, hence we update the resources, assigned to “Service Availabil-
ity,” by sending the resources from “In-house Servers” and “Cloudburst,” resulting in
the annotation ts1, s2, cu for the node “Service Availability.”
Since there are no attacks for this iteration of the algorithm R2 “ R1.
Output of Algorithm: The result of running the algorithm is an updated resource
assignment as follows:
Service Availability B ts1, s2, cu
In-house Servers B ts1, s2u
Server 1 B ts1u
Server 2 B ts2u
Cloudburst B tcu
DDoS B tdu
This is accompanied by the argumentation framework on weapons, with relation R
defined as.
d R s1 d R s2
Note that, in general there could be a set of argumentation frameworks with joint
attacks generated; but, in this case, there is only a single choice of argumentation
framework.
Analysis: Consider the output of the algorithm and observe that, since nothing
attacks d or c in R they are both elements of preferred extension E`. Hence c is ac-
ceptable with respect to E` in the conventional sense of the argumentation framework
defined by R2. Going further, since the argument Service Availability of the updated
attack-defence framework has resource annotation ts1, s2, cu and c is acceptable with
respect to E`, we can say that “Service Availability is an acceptable argument with
respect E`.”
We reinterpret the above from the perspective of security. The preferred extension
says that if a DDoS attack is active and the option to Cloudbursting is available then
we have Service Availability.
3.3 An algorithm for attack-defence frameworks, in its general form
We now distil the general algorithm from the above worked examples.
The input: An attack-defence framework pS,,Ñ, S ,Bq. I.e., a bipolar argu-
mentation framework pS,,Ñq with a resource assignmentBmapping arguments to
sets of multisets of weapons built from the atoms in S .
Remark 2. The attack-defence framework may be generated from an attack-defence
tree, by assigning a singleton atomic weapon to each action and the empty set of re-
sources to each node in the attack-defence tree. However, more general acyclic graphs
of relations and more detailed resource assignments are also permitted.
The initialisation: We define the initial mappingB0, belt B0 and set of joint attack
relation R0 as follows.
– B0“B
– B0 “ tx: x P S and there is no y P S such that y x or y Ñ xu
– R0 “ tHu
The inductive step: Let Bn`1 be a belt (not necessarily uniquely defined) such
that Bn`1 , Bn and for all y P Bn`1 there exists x P Bn such that x “ y or x  y or
x Ñ y, i.e., every element of Bn`1 is either in Bn or reachable from Bn. Notice there
must be some progress forwards, since at lest one element of Bn`1 must not be in Bn.
The assignment of sets of multisets of weapons to arguments is updated as follows.
y Bn`1 S n Y
ď
tT : Dx P Bn s.t. x Ñ y^ x Bn Tu where y Bn S n.




is then updated by using the set of joint attack relations
on weapons generated by each x y where x P Bn, x P Bn`1, Recall, that joint attack
relations map mutisets of weapons to single weapons. More precisely, we have Rn`1
is defined as follows, where  is point-wise union of sets of relations:
Rn`1 “ Rn  tR:@x P Bn,@y P Bn`1 s.t. x y^ x Bn`1 S ^ y Bn`1 T^
@m P T, Dw P m s.t. Dn P S s.t. n R w u
The above defines more formally the joint attack relations generated as described in
Section 3.1.
The output: Assuming the attack-defence framework is finite and acyclic, the
algorithm eventually terminates, returning the assignment and set of joint attack rela-
tions at that iteration of the algorithm.
Remark 3. This is just one possible algorithm. Note, some security assessments may
require more annotations and different algorithms for advancing from one belt to the
next, for interpreting the attack relation, and for interpreting the joint attack relation.
We return to this point in our discussion of this model, which occupies the remaining
sections of the paper.
4 Reorientation from the perspective of attack-defence trees
Let us motivate and explain what we are doing in this paper in a Socratic fashion start-
ing bottom up with the security requirements driven by examples of attack-defence
trees. This approach enables us to compare existing treatments of attack-defence trees
in the security area, with existing treatments of such frameworks in the argumentation
area. This enables us to export ideas and technical tools from the argumentation area
into the security area.
We take as a starting point an attack-defence tree in Figure 1 of reference [1],
reproduced in the Figure 11. We study this figure and compare it, bit by bit with ar-
gumentation frameworks, and try to see how to understand it in a new improved more
detailed point of view. Viewed as a bipolar argumentation framework (i.e., a graph
formed from attack and support relations) Figure 11 has the following characteristics.
1. The graph has no cycles. (The handling of cycles is still an open problem in the
attack-defence tree context, while it is more central in the argumentation context.)
2. The graph has a single top node (let us call it the goal g) to be defended and it is
layered as a tree with layer 1 defending/protecting g and each layer n`1 attacking
the previous layer n and or defending layer n´ 1.
3. The graph uses joint attacks and joint supports.
4. The nodes have internal meaningful contents. They are not atomic letter nodes.
This should be taken into account when offering semantics for the tree.
There are several ways of looking at Figure 11.
1. As a traditional formal argumentation framework. This works only for limited
examples, such as Figure 1.
2. As a graph for a game between two players (the defender/protector of g and the
attacker of g) the levels/layers are moves and countermoves of the players. This
view is better but still not exactly right. We shall also discuss this. The graph
can be flattened to a mini-max matrix. All defences can put forward in layer 1
— consisting of all possible best strategic defensive moves — and the attacker
can attack all possible defensive strategies and the net result is the solution. The
problem with this view is that we need to address more features of the application,
for example the temporal evolution of moves, the availability and cost of resources
and the local reasoning and aim of each player and, prospectively, the treatment
of cycles.
3. As action counter action temporal sequence between two agents, the one protect-
ing g and the other in principle attacking g. This is a much better view but it needs
to be fine-tuned to various applications.
We now ask how do we proceed, and where do we find the connection and use of
argumentation in the attack-defence trees context? We start with examples from both
areas and step by step, using a Socratic method, add components that converge towards
our target theory.
Let us now look at formal argumentation frameworks and find a framework to the
formal argumentation community, (Figure 12) which may be, on the face of it, similar
to what Figure 11 seems to be. We then continue our analysis of Figure 11 . Consider
Figure 12. In this figure we use a single arrow for support “Ñ” and a double arrow
for attack “”. To start our comparison, the nodes in Figure 12 are explained and
exemplified by nodes in Figure 11 in parentheses below.
Explanation of the nodes of Figure 12:
– g is the goal to protect (Data Confidentiality)
– a, b are supports (Physical Security, Network Security, etc.)















































































































































Fig. 12: A scenario with goals, at-
tacks and defences, in terms of at-





w bribe guard (weakens) u defeat guard (kills)
Fig. 13: A subtree of Figure 11, where
some attacks defeat and others weaken.
– x, y, z support a, b, c by attacking the attacks (Security Guard, Strong Password,
etc.).
Comparing Figure 11 and Figure 12, let us make some observations.
Observation 1. In Figure 11, consider the subpart of the figure represented by Fig-
ure 2. In this figure the node y does not attack β in the sense of “killing” β but makes
b stronger so that it can withstand the attack of β. In other words, the part of the fig-
ure (namely the formal attack and defence sub-figure to the left of Figure 2) can be
transformed to the bipolar argumentation framework to the right of Figure 2.
Figure 2 represents a bipolar argumentation framework, that is a framework with
attack and defence (in argumentation terminology). One of the interpretations of such
frameworks, from the argumentation point of view, is that to attack and kill a node b,
we need also to kill all of its supporters (i.e., we need to attack y as well). Adopting
established terminology [13], the set tb, yu forms a support group. Indeed this is also
the security view of the attack and defence in Figure 11, in that the attacks must
continue on node y “ Strong Password. Indeed in Figure 11, y “ Strong Password
is attacked by “Strong Password Attacks” (i.e. Find Note, Same Password Different
Accounts).
Observation 2. On the other hand, the part of Figure 11 depicted in Figure 13 consist-
ing of b, β, y with the additional options, u and w, is different. It has the additional fea-
ture that it the security guard is attacked in two possible ways: bribing, which weakens
the guard and may be ineffective, and killing, which removes the guard.This observa-
tion departs from mainstream argumentation. In argumentation, if a node x attacks a
node y (i.e. x  y), then if x is alive then the attack on y is always successful and x
kills y and y is dead. There is no intermediate result such as weakening y, which might
be accommodated in a more resource sensitive model.
From the perspective of security, a limitation of lifting directly from argumentation
without reworking the semantics is that resource considerations remain limited — all
arguments are either “in” or “out” with respect to some joint attack relation. For attack-
defence trees, when determining whether an argument such as “data confidentiality” is
maintained we consider the resources assigned to an attacker profile. Resources may
be specialised equipment or expertise, a budget or time; while profiles of attackers
may include cybercriminals, rogue states, script kiddies or cyberterrorists. Only by
combining such viewpoints can we estimates the vulnerabilities a system is exposed
to and priorities mitigating those attacks with limited security resources.
Instead of calculating whether nodes are in or out we may wish to calculate quan-
tities that remain after being attacked. For instance in Figure 10, for some attacker and
defender profiles, there may not be sufficient budget for the defender to use Cloud-
bursting, but there is not sufficient motive for the attacker to perpetrate the DDoS
attack any way. Bringing in such resource considerations from security would be a





Fig. 14: Scenario where a defen-






Fig. 15: Scenario with multiple goals, and
goals that are not necessarily security re-
lated.
Observation 3. Consider the framework in Figure 14. This is an acyclic graph rather
than a tree. There is no attack-defence node distinction: a “green” node can support a
“red” node (colours are meaningless in this model, they simplify making connection
with established attack-defence tree notations).
Scenario for Figure 14: A company with a limited cyber security budget may not
have the resources to defend against sophisticated attackers using in house security
solutions. Their solution to defeat these sophisticated cyber attacks is to outsource
part of their infrastructure to a secure Cloud environment. The dedicated expertise and
tools behind the Cloud-based security solution does reduce the risk of the company
becoming exposed to certain sophisticated attacks on their in-house infrastructure;
however, this move does leave open the organisation to new attacks. Thus, a side-effect
of employing Cloud-based security is that new attacks that exploit the fact that certain
operations are occurring over a WAN are enabled. Thus the use of certain defences
may support new attacks.
Notice that, while we do not have side effects in Figure 11, it is possible to add
examples of side effects. In Figure 13, killing the guard may activate a Murder Inves-
tigation as a side effect and we might not want that.
Observation 4. The scenario in Figure 15 presents multiple goals, which would not be
permitted if we restrict to trees. The privacy goal is to ensure ePassport holders cannot
be linked from one session to the next, which is called unlinkability. There are attacks
on unlinkability, involving relaying messages to remote readers [14]. Note further-
more, that such attacks do not completely compromise unlinkability, e.g., ePassport
holders cannot be tracked forever, only in a limited time window, so there are resource
considerations here.
The effectiveness of these relay attacks on ePassport unlinkability could be re-
duced by encrypting error messages that leak information. The added dimension is
that the defensive action of encrypting an error message attacks a second goal, which
is to satisfy the ICAO specification for ePassports so that the ePassport is compatible
with ePassport readers internationally. Thus there may be multiple goals, and not all
goals need be security related.
s1 Server 1 s2 Server 2
d DDoS
c Cloudburst
Fig. 16: Diagrammatic representation of
the argumentation framework generated al-
gorithmically in Section 3.2, which forms a
disconnected acyclic graph with no single
root node.
An additional reason for permitting
multiple goals and even disconnected
acyclic graphs is illustrated in Figure 9.
That figure depicts a graph with multi-
ple sinks which is an attack relation re-
alising that realises another attack rela-
tion that formed a tree. Thus by permit-
ting general acyclic graphs we can use
graphical notation to depict both attack-
defence trees, where arguments may be
attack trees, and its semantics given by a
set of joint attack relations where the tar-
get of each attack is an atomic action or
weapon. To see why such acyclic graphs
need not be connected, observe that the joint attack relation generated by the running
example in Section 3.2 can be depicted as in Figure 16. Recall that nothing attacked
the Cloudburst argument whose resources were denoted by the weapon c.
Observation 5. In formal argumentation frameworks, a node x attacking several tar-
gets attacks all of them in the same way. There is no option for different attacks for
different targets. This is not the case in Figure 11, “defeat lock” attacking the back
door is most likely not the same as the one attacking the front door. The attacks are
directional.
Observation 6. In Security, there is a stress on resources, hence the use of linear logic
in semantics for attack trees [15, 16]. Formal argumentation is based on classical logic.
Observation 7. The structure of an attack-defence framework could be taken further,
to provide a still finer semantics for attack-defence trees, by introducing an explicit
conjunctive support relation. For example, consider the first attack-defence tree in
Figure 17.
Existing semantics for attack-defence tree in the literature, and also the semantics
in this paper, are not sensitive to the fact that the reason that Overpower is countered
is that people were searched upon entry to the building. Indeed, the existing seman-
tics would assign the same meaning to the first tree in Figure 17 and the two other
scenarios.
In terms of the semantics provided, Overpower will be assigned the attack tree
denoted by to ˚ ku and a set of two attack relations, say tR1,R2u, will be generated,
Overpower






o Outnumber k Knives s Search
Fig. 17: A case for conjunctive support with two variations.
where s R1 k and s R2 o. Thus the semantics are currently indiscriminate about which
weapons or actions are countered by the argument Search — it is not necessarily the
Knives, as the first attack-defence tree in Figure 17 might intuitively suggest. As,
explained above, established multiset semantics in the literature [1] would also not
make it explicit that only the argument Knives is attacked.
The above limitation of the semantics could be resolved by an explicit conjunc-
tive support, which is interpreted in the algorithm by extending the weapons in the
nodes supported, using multiset union, by using the resources available to the source
node. This would enable the three scenarios in Figure 17 to be distinguished, since the
generated attack relations would be tR1u, tR2u and tR1,R2u respectively.
A further advantage of breaking down all nodes in an attack-defence tree into
arguments is that we can refer explicitly to sub-goals of attackers, not just the roots
of trees. That is, we can ask questions, such as whether a sub-goal is an acceptable
argument with respect to some preferred extension. Recent work on attack trees, has
argued for the value of giving sub-goals an explicit status [17].
Remark 4 (Summary of discussion in Section 4). We summarise the points learnt from
our discussion in this section. To give good argumentation like semantics for Figure 11
describing a security scenario, we need to enrich argumentation with the following
features:
1. And/or attacks and defence (this we have already in argumentation).
2. Allow converting attack to support and support to attacks (this has been done
previously [18], but for only the numerical case).
3. Allow for weakening attacks (as well as attacks which fail) in a directional way.
(This means that for the same live x and different targets, say for example, x 
y1, x  y2, and x  y3, it is possible that the attack of x on y1 will succeed, the
attack on y2 will fail and the attack on y3 will only weaken y3. Compare this with
numerical attacks which change the strength of the target by a numerical factor.)
4. Deal with side effects in the formal argumentation level, because in practice for
example when you hack into a server you may cause side effects.
5. We need one more principle: Consider below, where we have nodes a1, . . . , an
supporting g. To make sure we successfully kill g we need to kill all of a1, . . . , an.
This is for the case where all the ai are independent supports.
g
ana1 . . .
This is not like how it goes in logical and legal argumentation. If we have a1 $
g, . . . , an $ g, then attacking or falsifying all ai does not mean that g is false.
There may be some new x $ g.
In the model introduced in this paper, we embody this principal by assigning
arguments representing intermediate nodes in an attack tree no resources initially.
Since such nodes inherit all their resources from their supports, killing all their
supports kills the intermediate argument.
6. Running Global Side effects. Each node costs money. Guards need to be paid,
Keys need to be acquired, etc.. We have a global budget node which needs to be
treated as a special weapon node.
7. Local support. This principle has to do with supporting local nodes in the middle
of the tree. We note that in Figure 11 all the support nodes actually support the
security of the data. There is a sequence of nodes:
acquire keys lock door break in through door.
So let us add support to acquire key the support we add is “increase budget to
buy keys”. This support is not for server security, it supports locally the attack of
acquire keys.
5 Conclusion
This position paper proposes attack-defence frameworks, defined in Section 3, which
build on concepts in argumentation so that we may assess the acceptability of argu-
ments in security scenarios described by attack-defence trees. Attack-defence frame-
works borrow from some more recent developments in argumentation, namely:
– bipolar argumentation frames that incorporate support as well as attack,
– joint attacks for describing scenarios where multiple resources must be used to-
gether to execute an attack,
– and disjunctive attacks allowing multiple possible ways of realising an attack.
In addition, attack-defence frameworks take into account resource considerations, by
annotating arguments with sets of multisets of weapons or actions, which are essen-
tially attack trees. This semantics generates multiple possible ways of realising attacks,
which can, in turn, be used to explain why arguments such as Data Confidentiality or
intermediate goals such as Physical Security, or Lock Doors are acceptable arguments.
The development of attack-defence frameworks has been guided by examples from
the security domain. However, this model has been developed with other fields in
mind such as legal argumentation (think lawyers attacking each other), ecology (think
of species competing with and supporting each other) and medical sciences (think
of the side effect of taking medicine along the lines of Figure 14), hence may be
broadly applied. For security specifically, a key added value of this work is the notion
of evidence for an argument, as given by preferred extensions for example, which is a
central notion in the various semantics investigated in the argumentation domain. The
model admits general graphical structures to be described thus we are not restricted to
trees, nor are we restricted to asking question about a goal represented by a root node.
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